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Communities and Water Markets:
A Review of the Model Water Transfer Act
Santos Gomez and Penn Loh*
I. Introduction
Water issues have emerged as some of the most intractable of
contemporary policy issues, as regions around the world try to balance rapid
increases in demand with fixed, and sometimes declining, quantities of fresh
water. California, with the eighth largest economy in the world, a semi-arid
climate, and a growing population, is facing these issues. Demand for fresh
water continues to increase as supply remains relatively fixed due to the
rising economic and environmental costs of new infrastructure.1 Conflicts
over water continue to intensify. This dilemma has forced water planners to
consider the reallocation of existing supplies among competing and
sometimes conflicting uses.

* Santos Gomez is a Senior Research Associate at the Pacific Institute for
Studies in Development, Environment, and Security in Oakland, California, and the
Director of the Community Strategies for Sustainability and Justice. Penn Loh is the
Development and Research Director at Alternatives for Community and Environment
in Boston, Massachusetts. The research for this project was supported by the
Community Alliance with Family Farmers Foundation, the San Francisco Foundation,
the Gap Foundation, and the University of California Sustainable Agriculture
Research and Education program. We would like to thank Anna Steding and Arlene
Wong for their thoughtful review and comments.
1. While demands for water continue to increase, the traditional response of
developing new supplies is no longer a feasible option. Several factors have
contributed to this new reality. First, high project costs and declining public
resources have led to fewer projects being built. Second, environmental legislation
such as the National Wilde and Scenic Rivers Act and the Endangered Species Act
have limited the number of cost-effective sites. Third, there has been voter resistance
to pay for expensive new water projects as exemplified by the decisive rejection of
the Peripheral Canal bound measure in 1982. Fourth, recent public trust court
decisions make it increasingly difficult to construct new water projects. See e.g. ,Brian
E. Gray, The Shape of Things to Come: A Model Water Transfer Act for California, 4 WESTNORTHWEST 23 (1996); PENN LOH & SANTOS V. GOMEZ, WATER TRANSFERS IN CALIFORNIA: A
FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINABILITY AND JUSTICE (1996).
689
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Surprisingly, there seems to be growing agreement among economists,
environmentalists, urban water agencies and others that water markets can
and should help solve this problem. Economists have shown that market
transfers, in theory, could make water allocation more economically
efficient.2 Water would be voluntarily traded from lower to higher economic
value uses—primarily from agriculture to the urban sector.
Environmentalists endorse the idea because it has the potential to alleviate
the need for new, expensive, and environmentally damaging water supply
projects. Further, many believe that water transfers will provide an
opportunity for environmental interests to purchase water for environmental
uses.3 Urban water interests hope that water markets will provide new
supplies of water more cheaply than will building new infrastructure.4 Some
farmers view water transfers as an opportunity to improve farm profitability.5
Markets, however, "are not an end in and of themselves but a means to
the end of a water allocation process that serves both private and public
interests."6 Despite more than 15 years of policy discussions and initiatives

2. See generally BONNIE SALIBA & DAVID B. BUSH, WATER MARKETS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE: MARKET TRANSFERS, WATER VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987); T.L. ANDERSON,
WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(1983); BAY AREA ECONOMIC FORUM (hereinafter BAEF), USING WATER BETTER: A MARKETBASED APPROACH TO CALIFORNIA'S WATER CRISIS (1991); RICHARD W. WAHL, WATER
MARKETING IN CALIFORNIA: PAST EXPERIENCE, FUTURE PROSPECTS (1993) (Reason
Foundation, Policy Study No. 162, 1993); Charles H. Howe, Dennis R. Schurmeier,
and W. Douglas Shaw Jr., Innovative Approaches to Water Allocation: The Potential for Water
Markets, 22 WATER RESOURCES RES. 439 (1986); H.J. Vaux Jr. and Richard E. Howitt,
Managing Water Scarcity: An Evaluation of Interregional Transfers, 20 WATER RESOURCES RES.
785 (1994).
NATIONAL HERITAGE INSTITUTE [HEREINAFTER NHI], NHI PROPOSAL ON
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS TO FACILITATE WATER TRANSFERS (1995); ROBERT STAVINS AND ZACH
WILLEY, TRADING CONSERVATION INVESTMENTS FOR WATER (1993); ZACH WILLEY, ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY IN CALIFORNIA'S WEATHER SYSTEM (1985); Zach
Willey, Behind Schedule and Over Budget: The Case of Markets, Water, and Environment
[hereinafter Behind Schedule and Over Budget], 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 391 (1992).
3.

4. See e.g., METRO. WATER DIST. OF S. CAL. [hereinafter MWD], INTEGRATED
RESOURCE PLAN (Phase 1 Report, Final Draft, 1994).
5. See generally, Harold O. Carter and Henry J. Vaux Jr., Third-Party Effects: The
Research Challenge, in SHARING SCARCITY: GAINERS AND LOSERS IN WATER MARKETING 44
(Harold O. Carter, et al. eds., 1994). See also IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DIST., WATER
REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABILITY STUDY (1996). and PENN LOH AND ANNA STEDING, THE
PALO VERDE TEST LAND FALLOWING PROJECT: A MODEL FOR FUTURE CALIFORNIA WATER
TRANSFERS? (1996).
6. See e.g., NAT'L RES. COUNCIL COMM. ON W. WATER MGMT. [hereinafter NRC],
WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, ENVIRONMENT (1992).
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aimed at creating a long-term, state-wide market for water transfers, there
has been a lack of democratic discussion over public values in water and an
excessive focus on economic efficiency of allocation. The proposed Model
Water Transfer Act for California (Model Act)—the latest in a series of recent
proposals to reform the state laws governing market-based water
reallocation and water rights in California—does little to remedy these
deficiencies. Water in California is too important to economic prosperity,
environmental quality, and social well-being to be left entirely to market
reallocation. Water marketing reforms, as currently proposed, are unlikely to
support sustainability and equity as long as large segments of the
population, especially the poor and people of color, are excluded from the
debate.
This paper reviews the proposed Model Act with respect to community
impacts and suggests alternative solutions. It begins by reviewing the
evolution of water policy in California (Section II). Specifically, it explains
why the narrow market model usually proposed—and on which the Model
Act is premised—is not the proper institutional foundation for water
reallocation. Water is a free-flowing and shared resource that is not easily
turned into a private commodity. Furthermore, the market conflicts with
other public goals such as protecting rural communities, ensuring equity and
fairness, and promoting sustainability.
Then, in Section III, this paper reviews and critiques the Model Act,
with a special focus on the community and third-party impact provisions.
While the Model Act would lower some of the legal hurdles to water transfer,
and thereby create greater incentives for them, it fails to adequately protect
legitimate community and third-party interests.
This paper concludes that without making water allocation fairer and
more sustainable, water markets are unlikely to be consistent with public
ends and may not develop at all. Indeed, markets for water have yet to
emerge in California despite the fact that the state has passed more
legislation to encourage water marketing in the last decade than any other
state.7 On the other hand, if water transfer policies are built on a foundation
of a clearly defined public interest and a fair democratic decision making
process, then voluntary trades of water could contribute to a more
sustainable and equitable water future for the state.
II.

The Market Reform Strategy: A Historical Context
The desire to use the market institution to allocate water
resources throughout the West is quite appealing at first
glance. Indeed, it has been the failure to markets price

7. See e.g., Richard W. Wahl, Market Transfers of Water in California, 1 WESTNORTHWEST 49 (1994).
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water which has led to an exaggerated notion of the
seriousness of the 'scarcity' problem in the first place.
However, it is also important to look beyond the
theoretically desirable properties of a market allocation to
see if, in fact, an efficient solution will obtain.8
[T]he common inclination [is to] think of [water] transfers
in a mode of a contract, with two parties only—a buyer and
a seller. I believe that a more appropriate model would be a
diplomatic negotiation with a number of parties, each with
important and legitimate interests that need to be
accommodated, but without clearly defined rights. The
future of water transfers will be jeopardized unless something
like that broader and more inclusive model is embraced.9
Water transfers are not new, and have, in fact, been part of California's
water history since 1859 when the California Supreme Court held that water
could be "transferred like other property."10 Three years later, however, the
court recognized the rights of other water users when it ruled that the
transfer of water or water rights "must not be to the prejudice of the rights of
others."11 This principle of "third-party protection" remains intact today12 and
is viewed by many as the principal limitation on transfers of water in
California.
More recently, Hirschleifer, DeHaven, and Milliman were among the
first to promote the view that water was not special and should be treated
like any other commodity in its allocation.13 Economists suggested that a
market could allow water to flow from lower value to higher value uses.14 By

8. Victor Brajer & Wade E. Martin, Allocating a 'Scarce' Resource, Water in the West:
More Market-Like Incentives Can Extend Supply, But Constraints Demand Equitably Policies, 48
AM. J. ECON, & SOC'Y 268 (1989).
9. Joseph L. Sax, Understanding Transfers: Community Rights and the Privatization of
Water, 1 WEST-NORTHWEST 13 (1994).
10.
(1859).

See McDonald v. Bear River & Auburn Water & Mining Co., 13 Cal. 220

11. See Butte T.M. v. Morgan, 19 Cal. 609 (1862). It is important to recognize
that the "rights of others" as used in this case refers to other water rights holders and
not the community or non-water rights holders third-parties.
12.

See CAL. WATER CODE section 1702, 1706 (West 1996).

13. See JACK HIRSCHLEIFER,
POLICY (1960).

ET AL.,

WATER SUPPLY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY,

AND

14. See generally Clifford Lee, The Transfer of Water Rights in California: Background
and Issues (Governor's Comm. to Review Water Rights Law, Staff Paper No. 5, 1977);
692
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the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, proponents of water marketing in California
included the RAND Corporation and the Governor's Commission to Review
California Water Rights Law. These proponents suggested that appropriate
economic incentives were necessary to use water more efficiently and to
encourage voluntary transfers.15
During
the
1980’s,
economists,
urban
water
agencies,
environmentalists, and business interests began to focus on water
marketing as the best way to reallocate the state's water to urban growth
and environmental goals.16 Growing urban areas and businesses believed
that water markets would provide new water supplies more cheaply than
building new infrastructure. Some environmentalists supported water
markets as a way to prevent the construction of more dams and to
encourage more efficient practices and the purchase of water for
environmental purposes. Market advocates hoped that subjecting allocation
decisions to the economic calculus of the market would avoid the economic
inefficiencies generate by the political system of allocation dominated by a
few powerful interests.
In the hopes of encouraging water marketing, reforms over the past 15
years in California have established clearer property rights and removed
some restrictions on voluntary sales of water.17 Yet there have been few

CHARLES E. PHELPS ET AL., EFFICIENT WATER USE
DISTRICTS AND WATER TRANSFERS (1978).

IN

CALIFORNIA: WATER RIGHTS, WATER

15. See generally GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW;
FINAL REPORT (4978); CHARLES E. PHELPS ET AL., EFFICIENT WATER USE IN CALIFORNIA: WATER
RIGHTS, WATER DISTRICTS AND WATER TRANSFERS (1978).
16. See generally WILLEY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY IN
CALIFORNIA'S WATER SYSTEM, supra note 3. See also MOHAMED EL-ASHRY AND DIANA C.
GIBBONS, TROUBLED WATERS: NEW POLICIES GOR MANAGING WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEST
(1986); MARC REISNER & SARAH BATES, OVERTAPPED OASIS: REFORM OR REVOLUTION FOR
WESTERN WATER (1990).
17. See e.g., BRENT M. HADDAD, THE ECONOMIC UNDERPINNINGS OF EFFORTS TO
CREATE WATER MARKETS IN CALIFORNIA: WHY THE WELL IS STILL DRY (forthcoming 1996);
Gary D. Weatherford, State and Federal Water Transfer Legislation, Address Before the
BAEF Environmental and Water Law Section (July 26, 1996). In the early 1980s, the
California Legislature enacted policies that made water transfers not simply an
incidental feature of water policy, but vital to long-term water planning. The
Legislature declared "that...efficient use of water requires certainty in the definition
of property rights to the use of water and transferability of such rights." CAL. WATER
CODE section 109(a) (West 1996). The Legislature went on to say that it is "the
established policy of this state to facilitate the voluntary transfer of water and water
rights where consistent with the public interest in the place of export and the place
of import." Id.
693
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long-term inter-regional transfers and almost no market-like transfers in the
state.18 This section describes why the pure market model is not the
appropriate template for water reallocation policy. First, economic theory
makes various assumptions about well-functioning markets that are not, and
may never be, satisfied in the real world. Simply because a resource could
theoretically be allocated more efficiently does not mean that a market will
or should evolve.19 Second, the primary objective of markets—economic
efficiency—can, and in the context of California water does, conflict with
other important social values such as fairness in decision making, equitable
access, and sustainability. Economic incentives can make the attainment
of social goals easier and more efficient, but first these goals must be
better defined.
A.

Water as a Commodity: The Theoretical Economic
Underpinning

Water marketing reforms have been supported by neoclassical
economic theory. The "new resource economists" promoted the view that
natural resources were best regulated by privatizing rights and creating
markets for their allocation.20 Other economists were less outspoken, yet
optimistic about the possibilities of market reforms. Vaux and Howitt, using
an inter-regional trade model of water transfers in California, determined
that market transfers would offset the need for new supplies such that only
100,000 acre-feet of new capacity would be required by 2020.21 Such findings
of potential benefits of market allocation have bolstered reforms aimed at
instituting a private property regime for water.
In an ideal water market, self-interested individuals hold secure titles
that can be freely sold and transferred. When buyer and seller are given full
information of the costs, benefits, and alternatives, trades occur only if the

Other efforts designed to facilitate voluntary transfers included the right to
transfer reclaimed water and emergency transfers. Id. sections 1010, 1435; the right to
use the unused conveyance capacity of public agencies, id. sections 1810-14; and the
creation of a drought water bank, id. sections 480-82. More recent efforts to facilitate
water transfers include the Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-575, sections 3401-3412, 106 Stat. 4600 (1992), and the Monterey Agreement.
See e.g., IMPLEMENTATION IF THE MONTEREY AGREEMENT (May 1995) (Statement of
Principles by the State Water Contractors and the State of California, Department of
Water Resources for Potential Amendments to the State Water Supply Contracts).
18.

See LOH & GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 6-8.

19. See generally Peter S. Menell, Institutional Fantasylands; From Scientific
Management to Free Market Environmentalism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 489 (1992).
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See e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 2.

21.

See Vaux and Howitt, supra note 2, at 789.
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exchange benefits both. Thus, water allocation is determined by
decentralized decisions by individuals rather than by a central regulator.
Distribution of water is economically efficient because it flows to its highest
economically values uses, thus maximizing the sum of all economic benefits
received. True market allocation is distinguished from government use of
economic incentives in that prices are set by the market and not by the
government, as they are in a regulated water bank.22
According to economic theory, an efficient, well-functioning market
and its potential benefits can only be achieved under certain conditions.23
These include that:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

B.

Property rights must be clearly and completely specified,
exclusive, and transferable.
The infrastructure must exist for water to be transported from
seller to buyer.
3. Buyers and sellers must be fully informed about other buyers
and sellers, the water right, and the benefits and costs of the
trade and its alternatives.
The transfer must not impose costs on third parties (external costs).
Transaction costs must be minimal.
Buyers and sellers must be numerous enough so that no one
buyer or seller can influence price.
Feasibility of Market Conditions in California

The above conditions rarely hold in California. Active water markets in
the Western U.S. only exist under unique institutional and geographic
conditions that are not likely to be replicated broadly.24 In most regions,
there are many practical complications in establishing a water market. In
California, only some of the water rights are both quantified and secure
enough to transfer. Although appropriative rights claimed before 1914
should be quantified, they are only established through adjudication and
therefore are easily shuffled around. Further, most groundwater rights
remain unquantified.25

22.

See Willey, Behind Schedule and Over Budget, supra note 3, at 403.

23. See generally HADDAD, supra note 17; Brajer & Martin, supra note 8; Zachary
McCormick, Institutional Barriers to Water Marketing in the West, 30 WATER RESOURCES BULL.
953 (1994); Robert A. Young, Why Are There So Few Transactions Among Water Users, 68
AMER. J. AG. ECON. 1143 (1986).
24. See e.g., Ari M. Michelsen, Administrative, Institutional, and Structural
Characteristics of an Active Water Market, 30 WATER RES. BULL. 971 (1994).
25. Telephone interview with E. Anton, Chief Division of Water Rights,
California State Water Resources Control Board, (July 24, 1996).
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According to Tarlock, California's "water rights do not function to
allocate water, but as licenses to take until the taking is contested."26
Clarifying a water right and determining the potential impacts of a transfer
require expensive hydrologic studies of return flows and interactions with
groundwater.27 Parties other than the buyer and seller, including other water
rights holders, water recreationists, local communities and their economies,
as well as the environment, could be significantly affected if a transfer
changes the quantity or quality of water available at a certain place and
time. Uncertain water rights, costly and uncertain information, and impacts
on parties other than the buyer and seller all raise the costs of transactions.
These costs include looking for parties with whom to trade, verifying the legal
rights and physical characteristics of the water to be traded, negotiating price
and other terms, and obtaining legal approval for the transaction.28
Under these conditions, a long-term, inter-regional water market is
likely to be small, as has been the case so far in California. Participation is
limited primarily to those buyers and sellers connected to existing
conveyance systems who have the resources to pay high transactions costs.
Until recently, buyers have been dominated by one urban agency, the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California. More recently, other
urban water agencies, including San Diego County Water Authority and the
East Bay Municipal Utility District, have entered the market. Potential sellers
have been limited to those districts with reliable and secure rights: the three
major irrigation districts using Colorado River supplies, the four original San
Joaquin River exchange contractors, and Sacramento River water rights
holders. So far, only one individual seller has publicly entered
negotiations.29 Without numerous buyers and sellers, a water market would
not be well-functioning nor efficient, and thus potential benefits would not
be realized. Many potential buyers and sellers are not individuals but water
districts that hold water rights. These organizations sometimes block trades,
but often do so in order to protect their own viability and the interests of
their members and to ensure local control.30

26. A. Dan Tarlock, From Natural Scarcity to Artificial Abundance: The Legacy of
California Water Law and Politics, 1 WEST-NORTHWEST 71 (1994).
27. The Model Act does not address groundwater transfers per se, it only
addresses groundwater in conjunctive use with surface water transfers. As for pre1914 surface water transfers, the Model Act does not require SWRCB review of
approval.
28. See Bonnie G. Colby, Transactions, Costs and Efficiency in Western Water Allocation,
72 AMER. J. AG. ECON. 1184 (1990).
29.

See e.g., J.A. Savage, The Selling of Water, 25 CAL. J. 39 (1994).

30. See Barton H. Thompson Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and
Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 671 (1993).
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Some of these barriers to markets could be overcome, albeit at some
cost. Water rights could be more clearly defined and quantified. A simpler
administrative process could be implemented for transfers. Formulas could
be used to quantify and to compensate for community and third-party
impacts. While the Model Act makes incremental progress in many of these
areas, many of the market conditions listed above are unlikely to be satisfied
because they stem from water's physical characteristics and its importance
to community and individual well-being. Sax suggests that in each transfer
there are numerous parties, "each with important and legitimate interests
that need to be accommodated, but without clearly defined rights."31
C.

Desirability of Market Objectives: Is There More Than
Economic Efficiency?

A more important consideration than feasibility of markets is
desirability. Even if markets are more efficient than other allocation
institutions, the social values promoted by a market may conflict with other
legitimate public goals. The market's main purpose is to promote
economically efficient allocation; this is consistent with the values of
individualism, self-sufficiency, and decentralized economic organization.
Economic efficiency, however, is only a means to other social ends.
Community values, equity and fairness, and sustainability are not just
barriers to markets, they are also among the ends that allocation
institutions should help achieve.
Private water rights do not account for all the benefits of water that
accrue to the broader community. "Unlike almost every other form of
property, which we allow to be entirely privatized, water has always been
viewed as something in which the community has a stake and which no one
can fully own."32 Water districts in arid regions serve not simply to provide
water but also to resolve conflicts and realize local participation and
control.33 At the local level, existing water uses support the economy, tax
base, environment, and recreational values of the communities.34 Local
communities, such as Hispanic and Native American communities in the
southwest and other rural communities, derive an important sense of
cultural identity, of place, and of security from traditional water allocation

31.

See Sax, supra note 9, at 13.

32.

Id.

33. See generally, ARTHUR MAASS & RAYMOND L. ANDERSON, . . . AND
SHALL REJOICE: CONFLICT, GROWTH, AND JUSTICE IN ARID ENVIRONMENTS (1978).

THE

DESERT

34. CAL. ACTION NETWORK [hereinafter CAN], CALIFORNIA WATER MARKETING POLICY:
TOWARD ACHIEVING A NET BENEFIT FOR ALL (1992); CAN. & CAL. ASS'N OF FAMILY FARMERS,
SALES OF WATER IN CALIFORNIA: SOME THOUGHTS FROM AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITIES (1992).
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systems.35 Even from the state perspective, certain rural cultures and
environmental values are heritage resources that should be protected. In In
re Application of Howard Sleeper,36 Judge Encinas reversed the approval by the
New Mexico State Engineer of a water right transfer from an agricultural use
to a ski resort. He ruled that the "unique cultural heritage" of Northern New
Mexico should be preserved over the net economic benefits offered by the
ski development.37 According to the court, these types of collective benefits
are difficult to measure in market prices and therefore difficult to
compensate for in transfers. Supporting the values of conflict resolution,
community cohesiveness, and cultural heritage requires some measure of
public control over allocation.38
Purely economic markets are also objectionable if the goals are equity
in distribution and fairness in the decision making process. Creating a
system of private rights redistributes wealth. At the same time that rights
holders gain more secure titles to water, other individuals and the
communities that have benefited from the use of water in a particular place
and manner become "third parties" and potentially lose their historical
benefits if water is transferred without adequate protections. Of particular
concern is the fact that transfers of water would disproportionately harm the
poor since they have the fewest resources to adjust to economic changes
caused by the loss of water.39 The poor and people of color are also the least
likely to hold water rights and thus the least likely to benefit directly from
water sales. Economic theory holds that a wide range of distributional
outcomes are possible in a market, depending on the initial allocation of
rights. It is unlikely that a market based on the present disparities in water
rights and on the ability to adjust to economic changes will achieve an
equitable outcome. Achieving a more equitable distribution of water is not
an economic task, nor an afterthought to establishing a market; it is a
political task that needs to be discussed before proceeding with new
legislation or policy to create a water market.
In an unregulated market system, water is allocated according to
individual decisions to buy, sell, and use water. The public interest is
defined as the sum total of private benefits. Water planning then becomes

35. See e.g., F. LEE BROWN & HELEN M. INGRAM, WATER
SOUTHWEST (1987).

AND

POVERTY

IN THE

36. Case No. RA-84-53(C), Rio Arriba County, New Mexico, First Judicial
District (April 16,1985).
37.

Id.

38.

Id.

39.
note 9.
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irrelevant and private "wants," not public "needs," dominate.40 Market
reallocation, therefore, is not fair because water flows to those with the most
resources. The rich have more of a "vote" in the marketplace and will
determine how water will be used. By moving water to the highest-valued
uses as measured in economic terms, the market will distribute water
according to effective wants, not needs. Such a system will not support
widely accepted social goals such as providing affordable access to
adequate supplies of water for meeting basic human and environmental
needs, or as keeping public institutions responsive and accountable to the
public. As California's water needs change, driven by economic and
demographic changes, democratic processes and fairness in decision
making will increase in importance. Because water is so infused with public
values, only democratic institutions that allow public debate over the
common good can ensure fairness in allocation decisions.
Finally, markets do not promote the long-term sustainability of the
water resource. Markets do not ensure that ecological integrity is
maintained for future generations. Short-term gains often outweigh
preferences for future uses. Prices do not reflect the full value of the
services provided by ecosystems or the intrinsic value of pristine and
undeveloped water courses. Even if water could be purchased for the
environment, this water could not reach many of the wetlands and wildlife
refuges that are not connected to the state's water system unless new
infrastructure is built.
Water is also implicated in the sustainability of the state as a whole.
Ironically, market transfers of water from agricultural to municipal and
industrial uses, while preventing new dams, could allow for more
unsustainable growth in the state. Urban growth patterns have been led by
land-owning and developer interests, who have pursued new water supplies
not to meet existing needs but to facilitate unplanned growth and increase
their own wealth.41 This growth-oriented water ethic has resulted in more
than 110 approved or pending developments without identified long-term
reliable water supplies.42 Many urban water managers still ascribe to this
ethic and feel that it is their job to meet demands, not to control it.43

40. See Victor Brajer, et al., The Strengths and Weaknesses of Water Markets as They
Affect Water Scarcity and Sovereignty Interests in the West, NAT. RES. J. 489 (1989).
41. See ROBERT GOTTLIEB & MARGARET FITZSIMMONS, THIRST FOR GROWTH: WATER
AGENCIES AS HIDDEN GOVERNMENT IN CALIFORNIA (1991); Richard A. Walker & Matthew J.
Williams, Water from Power: Water Supply and Regional Growth in the Santa Clara Valley, 58
ECON. GEOGRAPHY 95 (1982).
42.

See E. BAY MUN. UTILITY DIST., LACK OF LONG-TERM RELIABLE WATER SUPPLIES (1995).

43. See DAVID L. FELDMAN, WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: IN SEARCH
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC 2 (1991).

OF AN
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In a market, large urban water agencies have the upper hand in
negotiations in terms of information, staff, and willingness to pay for water.
Thus, water marketing may result in more suburban sprawl at the expense of
open space, farmland, and rural communities. According to a recent study
by the American Farmland Trust, more than one million acres of farmland
(60 percent of which is prime farmland) will be lost to urbanization in the
Central Valley by the year 2040.44 Thompson notes that because many urban
agencies do not use marginal cost pricing, the water transfer option can be a
way for these agencies to avoid implementing politically sensitive
conservation and pricing practices that could reduce demand at less overall
cost.45 Recent evidence from urban water agencies—including the Goleta
Water District and the East Bay Municipal Utility District—support this
notion.46
III.

The Model Act: Inadequate Protections for Community and
Third-Party Impacts

As noted above, years of policy reform efforts and attempts to create a
market for inter-regional long-term water rights in California have yielded
few long-term, inter-regional, market-like transfers. Today, fresh attempts
are being made to create a water market. The Model Water Transfer Act for
California is the latest proposal to reform the state laws governing the
market transfer of water and water rights in California.47 Sponsored by the
California Business Roundtable, the California Chamber of Commerce, the
California Farm Bureau Federation, the California Manufacturers
Association, and authored by Hastings College of the Law Professor Brian E.
Gray, the Model Act reflects the view that voluntary water transfers can help
reallocate the available water supply to the benefit of all Californians.48

44. AM. FARMLAND TRUST, ALTERNATIVES FOR FUTURE URBAN GROWTH IN CALIFORNIA'S
CENTRAL VALLEY: THE BOTTOM LINE FOR AGRICULTURE AND TAXPAYERS (1995).
45.

Thompson, supra note 30.

46. Telephone interview with Bob Wilkinson, Lecturer, Environmental Studies
Department, University of California at Santa Barbara (June 6, 1996).
47. Beginning in 1979, the California Legislature enacted a series of statutes
designed to promote the voluntary transfer of water on a broader regional and
statewide basis. Such efforts, along with the creation of the 1991 and 1992 Drought
Water Bank, reflect the view that voluntary water transfers can help re-allocate
available supplies to the benefit of all Californians. See supra note 17 for additional
details.
48. The Model Act also reflects the recognition that water transfers have yet to
achieve their market potential to improve the effectiveness of California's water
system. It ignores the importance of water for social, environmental, and cultural
values. It also fails to acknowledge that water transfers, of all classifications and
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While the Model Act addresses some of the issues raised in Part II,
supra, and makes incremental progress toward establishing a market in a
number of very important areas—including efforts to create a set of
coherent transfer rules, to protect the rights of current water rights holders,
and to reduce the regulatory burden of water transfer review procedures—it
flounders in its attempts to provide adequate protections for communities
and third parties.
Language in the purpose and policies sections of the Model Act
proposes a "comprehensive set of laws to govern voluntary transfers of
surface water and to protect the legitimate interests of others who may be affected
by such transfers."49 In the Declaration of Policies, for example, the Model
Act states that "[t]o the extent that water transfers cause injury to. . .the
regional economies of areas from which water is transferred, these thirdparty interests must be appropriately protected or compensated."50 While
language in these sections acknowledges that community impacts are
legitimate interests that must be adequately protected or compensated and
seems to imply that they are adequately protected or mitigated, there is
little evidence to support this implication in the body of the Model Act.
Further, nowhere does the Model Act address the fundamental ethical
question concerning whether water developed by the public, through taxpayer
investment and for public benefit, should be marketed for private gain.
This section focuses on the need for more comprehensive community
and third party protections, and limits the discussion of other Model Act
issues accordingly. As the National Research Council concluded in Water
Transfers in the West: Efficiency, Equity, and the Environment:
[R]ecognition and protection of third party interests are
essential if water transfers are to achieve their potential to
reallocate water to meet new demands. . . . [T]he West has
never treated water as just another commodity and should
not do so now. There must be a balance between efficiency
and fairness.51

durations, produce winners and losers. And, as Ingram has noted, those individuals
whose interests are quashed by markets are "bound to pursue political avenues to
achieve benefits and avoid costs." Helen M. Ingram, Politics, Markets, Society, and Water
Resources, 14 HALCYON: J. HUMAN 57 (1992). Therefore, understanding California's
needs and changing water politics is the only way to move market discussions
forward.
49. See A MODEL WATER TRANSFER ACT FOR CALIFORNIA [hereinafter MODEL ACT]
section 102 (emphasis added), reprinted in 4 WEST-NORTHWEST 3 (1996).
50.

See id. section 101.

51. NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 8 (1992). This report highlighted the seriousness of community and
701

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

The Model Act, as currently written, fails to strike such a balance.
Community and third-party protections vary depending upon the class of
water being transferred or upon the duration of the transfer, and all
protections or mitigations are grossly inadequate. Short-term water
transfers require no community or third-party impact protection or
compensation. Protection or compensation for long-term water transfers,
which may be permanent in nature, are also inadequate.52 Only long-term
transfers involving water from land fallowing or in retirement qualify for
community and third-party protection or mitigation consideration.53
Expedited transfers of conserved water, as defined by Section 505, limit
review and comment, as well as limiting potential remedies for community
and third-party impacts to the "security deposit" of $5 per acre-foot of
water transferred.54
A.

Short-Term Water Transfers Require No Community or ThirdParty Protections

Under current water law, short-term water transfers are transfers of
water which are one year or less in duration. The Model Act, however, would
expand the term of short-term transfers to two years or less for transfers
between the same seller and buyer. The Model Act allows successive twoyear transfers to different buyers.55 Thus, a seller could conceivably enter
into two-year, consecutive agreements with different buyers and evade ever
having to safeguard against, or compensate the community or other third
parties for, reasonable impacts.

third-party impacts that might result from transfers of irrigation water from local
areas. The report stated that "[n]o issue gave the committee more trouble than that
question of how to characterize and evaluate the effects of water transfers on small
communities." Id. at 45.
52.

See infra Part III.B.

53.

See MODEL ACT; infra Part III.B.

54. See MODEL ACT. The "security deposit" must be adjusted annually by the
SWRCB based on changes in the Consumer Price Index published by the US
Department of Commerce. The liability of both buyers and sellers is limited to this
"security deposit," and the burden of proof is on the injured party who must establish
by a preponderance of evidence that the claimant's injuries were caused by the water
transfer and not other factors. See id. section 506(d).
55. See id. section 204 ("If a water right holder or water transferor enters into
successive short-term agreements with the same party...and if such successive
agreements with the same party...and if such successive agreements have
commencement dates within one year of each other and result in the transfer of
water for a term in excess of two years, the agreement shall be regarded as a longterm agreement...").
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Thus, in an effort to create the right economic and regulatory
incentives to facilitate market-based water reallocation and improve
economic efficiency, the Model Act has created a serious loophole for willing
sellers to sell their water irrespective of the adverse community or third
party impacts. According to section 404(a), the State Water Resources
Control Board (SWRCB) must approve the transfer unless it concludes that it
"would result in significant injury to any legal user of water" or "would
unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial uses."56
As section 404(a) is currently written, only other water rights holders
and the environment have standing to challenge short-term transfers. The
burden of proof rests on the parties that have filed protests in accordance
with section 403.57 Short-term transfers that meet section 404(a)
requirements, including consecutive transfer as long as it is not to the same
buyer, must be approved regardless of the adverse economic or social
impact on community or other third-parties. Such short-term transfers could
be based on land fallowing or in retirement, or be consecutive, yet not
require any protection or compensation of community or third-party
impacts. No challenge, regardless of the seriousness of the economic
impact, could be filed by the community or others adversely affected.
B.

Long-Term Water Transfers Require Community or
Third-Party Protections Only if Based on Land Fallowing or
Retirement

Similarly, protections or mitigation requirements for long-term
transfers are grossly inadequate despite the fact that they have a greater
potential to cause irreparable harm to the community or to third-parties.
The Model Act defines long-term water transfers as proposals or agreements
to transfer water for more than two years and includes the permanent
changes in water rights and permanent transfers of water.58 The Model Act
would prohibit the SWRCB from approving a long-term transfer unless it
concluded that the transfer "would not result in significant injury to any
legal user of water" and "would not unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other
instream beneficial uses." 59 Once the SWRCB concluded that the long-term
transfer complied with these requirements, and that it was not based on
water from land fallowing or in retirement, it is required to approve the
transfer, regardless of the impacts on the community or other third parties.
Thus, like short-term transfers, this category of long-term transfers does not
require any community or third-party protection or mitigation.

56.

See id. section 404 (emphasis added).

57.

See id. section 404(a).

58.

See id. section 204.

59.

See id. section 404 (emphasis added).
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Community or third-party protection or compensation is required only
for long-term agreements based on land fallowing or in retirement of
previously irrigated land that "cause substantial harm to the economy in the area
from which the water is to be transferred."60 It is unclear from the Model Act what
level of economic and third-party impacts would be sufficient to constitute
"substantial harm to the economy." Further, the SWRCB is required to take
into consideration any actions that the petitioner or other parties to the
transfer agreement have taken to mitigate harm to the economy.
Conceivably, then, parties to a long-term transfer of water from land
fallowing or in retirement that would result in "substantial harm" could
circumvent their obligation to the community by taking minimal actions to
mitigate such impacts. Thus, without a clearer definition of "substantial
harm" and corresponding responsibilities, parties to such transfers could
easily shed their legal obligations.61
Evidence suggests that long-term water transfers, especially those
from land fallowing or in retirement, do create undue economic and social
burdens on the economies and local governments in the areas from which
water is transferred. More importantly, impacts are not limited to long-term
or permanent transfers. Even short-term or emergency transfers have the
potential to create undue economic burdens. For example, evidence
suggests that the Drought Water Bank created substantial impacts on the
local economy, jobs, and social services. In 1992, the Yolo County Board of
Supervisors submitted a bill for $129,305 to the Department of Water
Resources for reimbursement of the county's additional expenditures for
General Assistance and Aid to Families with Dependent Children allegedly
caused by increased unemployment attributable to land fallowing and to the
transfer of water to the 1991 Water Bank.62 While the county's claim was not
substantiated, it illustrates the legitimate concerns held by local
communities and third-parties dependent on irrigated agriculture for
their livelihood.
Evidence from other long-term transfers, even those not involving
substantial land fallowing or retirement, suggests that impacts may be
substantial. A study of the Palo Verde Irrigation District—Metropolitan
Water District two-year transfer suggests that, while it is difficult to quantify
impacts with a high degree of certainty, there were a number of community
impacts.63 The study reveals that farm workers were adversely affected

60.

See id. section 404(c) (emphasis added).

61. See id. This provision does not apply to land within the San Joaquin Valley
Drainage Program study area.
62. See e.g., Brian E. Gray, The Market and the Community: Lessons from California's
Drought Water Bank, 1 WEST-NORTHWEST 17 (1994).
63.
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through the loss of on-farm jobs. The selling community experienced
negative effects from the loss of employment in farm-related industries.64
Even non-market transfers or water delivery cutbacks have the
potential for substantial impacts on local economies and on people that
depend on water for their livelihoods. A study of the impacts of the water
delivery cutbacks during the 1987-1992 drought on Mendota (Fresno
County), for example, concluded that:
•
•

•
•
•

irrigated cropland decreased by 14 percent as a result;
farmers substituted groundwater because of the loss of surface
water deliveries and may have exacerbated groundwater
overdraft;
employment and wages, as well as the number of farms, declined
substantially in the Mendota area;
non-agricultural, related businesses declined substantially; and
tax revenues and property values, including agricultural land
values, declined.65

Thus, the premise that only long-term transfers of water from land
fallowing or retirement can result in substantial impacts on communities
and other third-parties is not supported by the evidence. As we have
illustrated above, transfers of water, whether short-term or long-term,
market-based or the result of drought conditions or legal mandates, can
have substantial impacts on communities and third parties. Given this
evidence, the standards and procedures for expedited transfers of conserved
water are very troublesome.
C.

Expedited Transfers: Inadequate Safeguards and Remedies

The Model Act's expedited transfer provisions purport to provide
adequate community and third-party protections by limiting the amount of
water that can be transferred to the transferor's historic consumptive use
plus any water that is irretrievably lost to all beneficial uses. However, we
strongly disagree. These limitations may provide some protections for other
water rights holders, instream uses, and groundwater recharge, but they fail
to protect the interests of communities or other third-parties which are
likely to be adversely affected. Not only are protections inadequate as the
Model Act is currently written, but a community's (or a third-party's) ability
to challenge an expedited transfer is seriously limited. As the author of the
Model Act has stated, one of the central purposes of the Model Act is to

64.

Id. at 13-17.

65. See DON VILLAREIO, 93640
ERA OF WATER UNCERTAINTY (1996).
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"permit. . .transfers to occur relatively quickly and inexpensively without
substantive pre-transfer review by the State Water Resources Board and
without post hoc substantive review by the courts."66
In addition to inadequate public and judicial review, section 505 and
506 limit the amount of damages to the $5 "security deposit" per acre-foot.
Section 505 of the Model Act requires that a $5 "security deposit" per acrefoot of conserved water transferred be placed in a community and thirdparty environmental compensation and mitigation fund managed by the
SWRCB.67 Revenue from the compensation and mitigation fund would be
used to pay for damages caused to the environment, other water rights
holders, and to the community. Compensable community injuries are
limited to the loss of tax revenues and to the increased social services costs.
Damages to farm workers, to businesses that depend on the current uses of
water, and to others would not be compensable. Limiting compensable
damages to local governments is inadequate given the number of other
third-parties that can be reasonably expected to be adversely impacted by
water transfers—farm workers, businesses, land owners, among others.
Others have expressed similar views, and have suggested other
mechanisms for endowing the compensation fund and for its use.68 The
Natural Heritage Institute, for example, favors the creation of an impact
compensation fund that would recapture the excess profits when and where
they accrue in water transfers.69 The Rural Water Impact Network (R-WIN)
has recognized the practical limitation in attempting to recapture the excess
profits and is advancing a community mitigation proposal that calls for a
tiered water transfer fee schedule based on the type of water and the nature
of the transfer.70 While R-WIN's proposal is still evolving, it would exempt
the transfer of water conserved through efficiency, through banking of water
in wet years in excess of contract, and through small-scale intra-regional
agriculture to agricultural transfers. The transfer of water conserved through
rational fallowing, field crops, row crops, and permanent crops would e
subject to increasing fees, with fees for long-term transfer (those greater

66.

Gray, supra note 62, at 34.

67.

MODEL ACT, sections 505, 506.

68. See Gregory A. Thomas & Tara L. Mueller, Reflections of the "Model Water
Transfer Act" by the Natural Heritage Institute, 4 WEST-NORTHWEST 91 (1996).
69. Id. NHI defines excessive profits as the difference between the cost of
water (including the cost of conserving or salvaging it) to the seller and the price (net
of less the transaction costs) necessary to motivate the transfer. NHI then would use
the value of that same block of water in other applications as the proxy to determine
the price necessary to motivate the transfer. Id. While such an approach seems
theoretically sound, it might prove difficult in practice.
70. RURAL WATER IMPACT NETWORK, A PROPOSAL FOR ADDRESSING IMPACTS
WATER TRANSFERS AND REALLOCATIONS IN CALIFORNIA'S AGRICULTURAL REGIONS (1996).
706

FROM

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

than one year) twice as high as those for short-term transfers.71 While such a
tiered fee structure might discourage some marginally beneficial transfers, it
attempts to more accurately correspond to the community and third-party
economic impacts of communities that lose the water. This structure is
supported by preliminary findings of the Pacific Institute.
IV.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Efforts to create a market for water must balance the historically
competing commodity and community perspectives on water and build
upon a common understanding of the values involved and of the necessity
of communication and cooperation. The problem with and the conflict in
recent efforts to create water markets, including the Model Act, is not that
they acknowledge that water has "economic" value, but that they attempt to
divorce water from its value to the community. As F. Lee Brown has noted,
"Water has value to traditional societies . . . even if it is not scarce. . . . The
assessment that water has become an economic good. . .does not logically
or empirically imply that prices and markets are necessary institutional
prescriptions for handling the problem of its scarcity."72
This paper has argued that economic theory and rationale alone is
insufficient to create a market for water. Water is and has always been a
shared community resource, vital to fulfilling both individual and public
values. A free market, as envisioned by the Model Act, is not the appropriate
model for water allocation because it limits public debate in water policy
and excludes the values of community security, equity, and sustainability.
As stated previously, community values and equity and fairness are not
mere barriers to markets, but are among the ends that allocation
institutions should help achieve.
The Model Act fails to integrate community and social values with the
efficiency goals of a market. While it would give current water rights holders
incentives to sell their water to the highest bidder, and, we would argue, give
them a windfall, it is unclear how that alone would result in improved water
reliability and sustainability. We have argued elsewhere that the Model Act
might actually limit the ability of the SWRCB and other regulatory agencies
charged with protecting the public interest to uphold and more strictly
enforce the "reasonable" and "beneficial" use doctrines.73

71.

Id.

72. F. Lee Brown, Water Markets and Traditional Water Values: Merging
Commodity and Community Perspectives 5 (unpublished manuscript, presented at
the conference "Water: A Trigger for Conflict/A Reason for Cooperation, at the Indiana
Center for Global Change and World Peace," Indiana University, Mar. 8, 1996).
73. See LOH & GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 17. The Act would allow conservation and
transfers to establish "reasonable" use in the face of prior unreasonable use by the
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Similarly, the Model Act fails to establish clear qualifications for
buyers and sellers. We have recommended elsewhere that buyers should be
required to demonstrate that they need the water, that there are no better
alternatives for supply, and that they are conforming to certain standards of
efficiency.74 While this places an additional burden on potential buyers, it
ensures that potable water is not being used to promote wasteful water use
practices at the expense of sustainable agriculture or of basic human or
environmental needs. A potential means by which to set these
requirements, which the Model Act does not include, is through a thorough
and consistent interpretation of the "reasonable" and "beneficial" use
doctrines. Conceivably, such limitations would not result in more efficient,
beneficial, or sustainable use of California's water supplies. Rather, the
Model Act could simply facilitate the flow of water to those with the greatest
financial ability to pay for it.
While we believe that long-term, inter-regional voluntary transfers can
help support communities and economies, this will not occur without
changes in existing institutions. For efforts to create a water market to
succeed, especially in a demographically and geographically diverse state
like California, they must facilitate greater community participation in water
policy in general and water transfers in particular. Then, and only then, will
we move closer to creating a market for transfers that balances and protects
the interests of existing water rights holders, potential buyers, the
environment, and communities.

water rights holder, as was the case in the Imperial Irrigation District--Metropolitan
Water District transfer. Further, by not requiring that potential buyers of water first
put all their existing water to beneficial use to the fullest extent possible, nor prevent
waste, unreasonable use, or unreasonable method of use, there is no guarantee that
transfers will not exacerbate urban sprawl, groundwater overdraft, and other
unsustainable water management problems. Id. at 18.
74.
708

Id.

